Kashmir: Sustaining Insurgency

Come January 2019, insurrection in Kashmir will turn thirty. How do we assess the present status of this insurgency in the Valley?  Indeed, insurgents are setting the narrative in Kashmir. A report compiled by the J&K Police, in August 2018, establishes this reality. Over the last decade, the number of active insurgents hovered around 200, even touching a low of 78 in 2013 – lowest since 1990. Police report projects their present figure to be 327 of which majority, 211, are locals. While Hizb-ul- Mujahideen (HM) and Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) - estimated cadres 141 and 128 respectively- retain their dominance, Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) too have strengthened its base this year¹. In the backdrop of high attrition rate, 200 in 2017 and 130 thus far this year, these numbers are ominous.

The insurgency in the Valley has had its lows- periods of relative peace- yet it has sustained all this while and end to this conflict seems nowhere in sight. Over the last three decades, Kashmir has evolved - in terms of its politics, discourse, insurgency, the form of external support, perceptions and probable solutions. On the other hand, Indian establishment, ensnared in outdated response-templates, has thus far been outsmarted in this battle of wits by mainstream politicians, separatists/hardliners, insurgent leadership, external forces or even by the common Kashmiri alike. Today, slogans like ‘Kashmiriyat-Jamooriyat- Insaniyat’, ‘developmental agenda’, ‘sky is the limit’ or even ‘alienation of youth’ are all expired coinage in the Valley.

Sustaining Insurgency.

Ever since 1990, insurgents have constantly upgraded their modus operandi. Effective use of social media is the latest addition to their armoury. Conceptually too, the insurgency has undergone metamorphosis.

Independence for Kashmir-Kashmir Banega Khudmukhtar:

In initial stages of current insurrection, Azadi (independence) slogan enamoured hordes of Kalashnikov-wielding young men who roamed streets of Srinagar and of other towns in the Valley. The sounds of gunfire and explosions mingled with chants of Azadi emanated from demonstrations composed of people from all strata. This phase was spearheaded by Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), an organisation that believes in sovereign Kashmir, independent of both India and Pakistan. Whether by coincidence or by design, JKLF flag bears resemblance to Palestinian national colours. As insurgency caught imagination of the public, strains of   Muslim Kashmir as an independent entity – a seed sown by Sheikh Abdullah during 1931 revolt against Maharaja of J&K -started manifesting itself. This made Pakistan uncomfortable and compelled her to course correct the conflict. 

Accession to Pakistan-Kashmir Banega Pakistan:

It is reported that 5,119 insurgents were killed between 1990-1994² and many times more injured. Pakistani military's Inter-Services- Intelligence (ISI) – which provided weapons and training to the Kashmiri Insurgents since its inception in the 1980s- cut off its aid to JKLF and fully supported HM. By 1996, HM, a pro-Pakistan outfit, emerged as the dominant group in the conflict. The narrative in Kashmir thus shifted from the slogan of JKLF - ‘Kashmir Banega Khumukhtar’ - to that of HM- ‘Kashmir Banega Pakistan’.  Pakistan thus fully controlled the levers of conflict in Kashmir, both ideological and assets on the ground.

Suicide- Fidayeen- Attacks:

It was now natural for Pakistan to upgrade the conflict to the next level. Fidayeen offensive in Kashmir commenced after Kargil conflict in 1999. Thereafter, the period up to 2002 was marked by 55 Fidayeen attacks, costing Security Forces (SF) 161 precious lives and leaving 90 Fidayeen dead³. Such attacks were carried out by small teams of two men each who would penetrate high-profile targets, like SF headquarters, State Legislature etc, and blow themselves up causing immense damage to life and assets. These attacks left a tremendous psychological impact, raising the costs for SF in terms of enhanced vigil while insurgents regained public adulation. 

 Fidayeen, save for in odd cases, were mostly Pakistani recruits of LeT or JeM, both radical religious organisations based in Pakistan. Thus far, this has been the bloodiest phase of the conflict in Kashmir. Pakistan, emboldened with their success, also orchestrated similar attacks in mainland India -  in 2001 a failed assault on India’s Parliament and a bloody one by LeT on Mumbai’s Hotel Taj that left 166 civilians dead.

Massacres to Scare Non-Muslims and Scuttle their Return to the Valley:

In 1990, there were targeted killings of Kashmiri Pandits (KPs) by insurgents to scare them out of the Valley. By late 1990, insurgents had achieved their aim with only a minuscule number of KPs staying back in the Valley. Insurgents perpetuated ghastly massacres even on these residual members to completely purge the Valley of all non-believers. Seven KPs were butchered in Sangrampora in 1997, in Wandhama 23 of them were massacred in 1998, while 24 members of this community were brutally killed in Nadimarg in 2003.  These massacres were also aimed at scuttling any attempts of return and rehabilitation of KPs in the Valley.

Sikh population in the Valley too was targeted. 35 Sikhs were massacred in Chittisingpura in 2000. Even Hindus in Muslim majority Doda Distt., South of Pir Panjal, were not spared. 25 Hindus were killed in Chapanari and 26 of them were butchered in Prankot in 1998 while 35 Hindus were massacred in Doda in 2006⁴. These massacres too were aimed at triggering mass migration of Hindus from these Muslim majority areas in Jammu region. 

Scuttling Peace process:

 Violence in the Valley receded post-2003 as Kashmir was then witnessing attempts, first by Atal Behari Vajpayee and later by Manmohan Singh, to broker peace with Pakistan and the insurgents. During the 'peace process' era,  number of causalities decreased significantly – from 4,507 in 2001 to 377 in 2009⁵. It also ushered in an atmosphere of hope in the Valley when SF footprint reduced in Srinagar and it infused a sense of change in the public mind. However, these ‘peace’ deliberations split the secessionist leadership into hawks and droves. There was stiff opposition to this process from the hardliners like Sayed Ali Shah Geelani and the insurgent leadership. Conflicting opinions about the ‘peace process’ brought extreme radical views in Kashmir to the fore. The apprehension that the peace process might itself end up becoming a resolution to the conflict sealed the fate of this process⁶. As efforts to broker peace did not deliver, violence returned to the Valley.

Agitational Terrorism-Intifada:

Parvez Musharraf, then President of Pakistan and architect of ‘Four Point Formula’ for resolution of Kashmir issue, was voted out of power in 2008 and that put paid to ‘peace process’.  Amarnath land row, in 2008, acted as a trigger to mobilise tens of thousands of Kashmiris on roads seeking a political resolution to the Kashmir issue. Mufti Mohammed Sayeed, then Chief Minister (CM), looking to consolidate his own position, toppled the state government by pulling out of PDP-Congress alliance.   Even shrewd Mufti misread the public mood to be voted out of power. National Conference (NC)- Congress combine was voted in and Omar Abdullah took over as the CM. 

In 2009, rumours about rape and murder of two young women in Shopian resulted in a long agitation. The build-up for a major crisis began with a story of a fake encounter at Machil, in North Kashmir, gaining currency. In 2010, public erupted again and more than 100 civilians were killed. Kashmir remained shut for months. These two public mobilisations, in 2008 and 2010, brought up new images of violence in Kashmir -  of stones replacing AK-47. Insurgent leadership had deftly managed to bring the international focus back on Kashmir, this time as a case of popular uprising⁷.

Now a new phenomenon has emerged in Kashmir. Thousands gather at the sites of encounter between SF and insurgents. Civilians then resort to pelting of stones at SF engaged in combat with the insurgents and, at times, latter manage to escape from the SF dragnet.  Even during the funeral of slain insurgents, thousands gather for their last rites when some armed men appear on the scene to offer a gun salute to their departed comrades. On October 3, 2015, about 20,000 people attended the funeral of Abu Qasim, LeT commander, who had killed Sub. Insp. Mohammad Altaf, a local. This high-pitched support for a slain Pakistani terrorist showed that there was a wide swath of support for the Lashkar’s religio-insurgent zeal⁸.

A new dynamic has already crept in Kashmiri society. Earlier people used to wait for the dead bodies of insurgents to be handed over by the police. Now they rush to the encounter sites to save them. That is why insurgent killings now are also accompanied by civilian killings, offering an excuse to separatists to accuse SF of human rights abuse.

Alarming Span and Scope of Fresh Recruitment;

Increasing trend of locals joining insurgent ranks is as worrying as is the realisation that those joining their ranks are educated and, in some cases, from affluent families. 126 youth in the Valley joined insurgent ranks in 2017 while this year this number has gone up with 130 of them have already joined their ranks till August⁹.

Junaid Sehraj, an MBA and from an affluent family, Manna Wani, a PhD scholar, Mohammed Eisa Fazli, an engineering student are examples of the educated and the affluent joining the insurgent ranks¹⁰. This trend is indeed worrying and seems to be in line with the recruitment policy of the Islamic State of Syria & Iraq (ISIS). (Author’s personal interactions during a recent visit to Kashmir reveals that recruitment to insurgent ranks is allowed only after a thorough background check).

Use of Social Media & Online Radicalisation:

Burhan Muzaffar Wani, the poster boy of Kashmir insurgency, initiated cyber outreach for the separatist movement which had been quiescent since 2010. He created Twitter handle @Gazi_Burhan2 in October 2012 and would upload photographs of atrocities allegedly perpetrated by security forces as well as virulent anti-India content. His calls to youth to join Jihad were accompanied by Quranic verses, emotive demands for Azadi and exhortations to establish the Nizam-e-Mustafa (God’s government).

Valley’s 60% population is below 30 and is hyperactive on social media. Burhan's cyber blitz attracted young minds to the insurgency.   In a first of its kind, he started sending photographs of himself and his comrades, faces uncovered, brandishing weapons at identifiable locations around Srinagar. All this imparted a notion among the youth that taking to arms was a heroic and risk-free job¹¹.

Islamic State of Jammu & Kashmir (ISJK):

 Much that Indian government may deny, Islamic State of Jammu & Kashmir (ISJK) and al Qaeda are gaining a foothold in Kashmir. Until recently Zakir Musa was commander of HM. He openly stated his desire to implement a hard-line interpretation of Islamic laws in Kashmir- claiming concepts like nationalism and democracy were un-Islamic. He even threatened to behead Hurriyat leaders who seek resolution of Kashmir through political means. Later, Musa broke away from HM and floated a breakaway group, though denying any affiliation to al Qaeda yet thanking the organisation for promoting Sharia. He disowns Pakistan and fight for Kashmir’s secession from India, for Musa’s mission is not limited to Kashmir as he hopes to capitalise on grievances of the Muslims in India. His statement suggests an element of transnational-Jihadism is being introduced into Kashmir conflict that lays bare developing ideological divide between different generations of insurgents in Kashmir.

If Musa’s new outfit gains a measure of success, it would shift the focus of insurgency that has long been defined by localized Islamism that values self-determination to transnational-Jihadism. New Delhi needs to sit up and take notice of this worrying trend of transnational-Jihadism, of the kind of IS and al Qaeda, gaining a foothold in the region¹².

That J&K Police, on June 22, 2018, has claimed to have eliminated Dawood Ahmed Sofi, ISJK Chief,¹³ and the fact that two suspected ISJK insurgents have been arrested in Delhi on September 7, 2018¹⁴, makes it abundantly clear that ISJK is fast spreading its tentacles in Kashmir.

Targeting of Police Personnel and their Kin:

With an aim to blunt the cutting edge of J&K Police's counter-offensive, insurgents are resorting to the killing of police personnel and abductions of their kin. On August 30, 2018, 11 kin of J&K Police personnel were abducted by HM from various villages in Pulwama, Shopian and Anantnag Districts, in retaliation to arrest/detention of the family members of three of their cadre, including the father of HM operational commander Riyaz Naikoo.  However, on September 3, 2018, HM released the abductees after the government freed the detained family members of their cadre.

In an audio clip posted on social media on August 31, 2018, Riyaz Naikoo said their fight was against India and that Kashmir Police had become a “victim of Indian conspiracy” and its frontline. “We have tolerated a lot till this day and tried to make police understand but they did not listen. From now onwards whosoever becomes an obstacle in our struggle, his fate will be that of an enemy”¹⁵. As a result, several Special Police Officers (SPOs) have publicly announced their resignation from the force.

Picking up of family members of insurgents is seen by many as replicating the Punjab Police template of targeting the terrorists’ families that forced terrorists to relent and ease their targeting campaign. This tactic is unlikely to work in Kashmir for the ground reality in the  Valley  is entirely different.

Indian Response.

            When Kashmir erupted in revolt in 1998-1999, very few in New Delhi had any idea how to handle Kashmir. India had failed to comprehend strategic consequences of the rise of militancy in Punjab in the 1980s and its impact on Kashmir. Unnoticed or ignored by the State, in 1988 hordes of Kashmiri youth crossed over to Pakistan for weapons training.  When New Delhi was just about coming to grips with Punjab, Soviet pull-out from Afghanistan, in 1988-1989, made services of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and his men available to Pakistan’s ISI to train Kashmiri rebels in arms. By mid1989, armed Kashmiris returned to the Valley with Kalashnikov in their hands¹⁶.  Armed insurgency unleashed by these youngsters was only the military component of the strategy to wrest Kashmir from India. The political and State subversion had been unleashed much earlier.

            Ignoring Subversion of the State Apparatus.

 Al Fatah, a subversive and an espionage group, began operating in Kashmir in 1970. Among its cadres were members of Plebiscite Front, an organisation seeking plebiscite in J&K of which Sheikh Abdullah was the patron. Many of their cadres were arrested.  No sooner Sheikh returned to power in 1974, cases against them were withdrawn without any stigma about their past. They were rehabilitated either by way of absorption in key government jobs, like Hamidullah Bhat, Mohammed Hussein and others, or by taking them on National Conference rolls¹⁷. The trend to induct, into State administration, those who were inimical to Indian interests in   Kashmir continued with impunity after Ghulam Mohammed Shah took over as the CM in 1984. It is common knowledge in Kashmir that radicalised Jamaat-e-Islami cadres were absorbed in the State administration, especially in Police Department, in large numbers during Shah’ tenure. It is alleged that these cadres played a very crucial role in sustaining insurgency in early stages by providing insider support to the insurgents¹⁸. Did all this happen unknown to New Delhi?

             

Weak-kneed Response to Crisis Situations.

Kidnappings:

The full-blown insurgency in Kashmir reared its head in an era of political uncertainty in New Delhi. V.P. Singh government at the Centre, preoccupied with its own survival, hardly had any time or inclination to intervene in Kashmir. When the daughter of Mufti Mohammed Sayeed, then Union Home Minister, was kidnapped, in 1989 by JKLF, New Delhi succumbed to insurgents’ diktats by agreeing to free five hardcore JKLF insurgents in lieu of her release. Despite protest by Farooq Abdullah, then CM, Central team, comprising I.K. Gujral, Arif Mohammed Khan and M. K. Narayanan, insisted on the release of insurgents, even threatening Farooq with dismissal in event of his refusal¹⁹. Rest all is history. Javed Ahmed Zargar, one of those released, was later involved in the hijack of the IC-814 plane in December 1999²⁰.

Second high-profile abduction, in 1991, was of Nahida Imtiaz, daughter of Saifuddin Soz, then NC MP, by Jammu & Kashmir Students League Front(JKSLF). Though denied by the government, news reports claimed that Chandershekhar government freed secessionist Mushtaq Ahmed in exchange for the release of Nahida from captivity²¹.

                       

Hostage Situations:

In 1993, 40-odd second-rung insurgents took over Hazratbal shrine in Srinagar and held J&K administration to ransom for 15 days. The J&K government didn't know how to handle the situation and, much against the advice of army, extended 5-Star treatment to the insurgents before allowing them a safe passage²². Same confusion was evident during the Charar-e-Sharief crisis when Mast Gul managed to escape the siege laid around the town only to surface later to a rousing welcome in Pakistan²³ and during Hijacking of IC 814 when dreaded militants were released as a deal for safe return of passengers.

                       

Killers of Minorities Remain unpunished.

Farooq Ahmed Dar @ Bitta Karate admitted on national media to have killed 20 KPs in cold blood but he has not been punished for these murders till date. Sadly, he was let off by the Trial Court for the failure of the prosecution to produce evidence²⁴.  Even Supreme Court refused to reopen the investigations against Bitta Karate and Yasin Malik for the killings of KPs²⁵. Both are now prominent public figures in Kashmir. No government can be so insensitive to its citizens. All this has emboldened the Kashmiri insurgents no end.

Unilateral Ceasefire - Surrendering Initiatives.

Indian state refuses to learn lessons from history. Despite an earlier failed attempt to broker peace through unilateral cession of operations in 2000, Modi government repeated the mistake this year surprisingly when insurgents were under tremendous pressure from SF. An unwise decision to go in for unilateral cessions of operations against insurgents snatched the initiative from SF and allowed insurgents to regroup and re-strategize. In both instances, in face of mounting attacks by insurgents, ceasefire had to be withdrawn.

Way Forward.

            Government’s Kashmir policy is in tatters. Even now, New Delhi is as confused as it was in the early 1990s. Understanding the problem is the first step towards any solution. India refuses to accept that the problem in Kashmir is of Muslim identity assertion. Unless Kashmir is addressed soon enough more Kashmirs are likely to sprout within Indian union.

            In today's world, Kashmir does not garner the same sympathy as in pre—9/11 era when Bill Clinton called it a ‘nuclear flashpoint'. The post-9/11 world has no patience for armed uprising associated with Islamic terror. Linking of Kashmiri insurgents to Pakistani terror groups, like LeT and JeM, has snatched Kashmiris’ moral compass of what may have been otherwise a genuine political demand. It is unlikely that a focused military intervention in Kashmir would attract serious global admonishment. The government should take advantage of this favourable worldview.

            There is an urgent need to strengthen strategic communication in Kashmir. Indian state must exploit a growing ideological rift between those who fight for political separatism and those, like ISJK and al Qaeda, who consider Kashmir a part of transnational Jihadism. Pakistan leverages Kashmir through hardliners and its loyal insurgents in the Valley. The challenge that Zakir Musa has thrown is a fundamental challenge to Pakistan’ s interests in Kashmir.

            Patch-work political alliances are unlikely to douse the flames in Kashmir. The State apparatus in Kashmir is largely subverted. An extended spell of Central rule, under an able and politically neutral administrator, would go a long way in toning up the governance in the State. 

            Trifurcation of the state, as is rumoured now²⁶, would be suicidal at this stage. That would be to separatists’/insurgents’ liking. On the other hand, rehabilitation of KPs in the Valley should be taken up by the Union government far more vigorously. KPs have an inalienable right to their land. It may be a tough call for now, but it needs to be pursued to call separatists’ bluff.

            At the operational level, all SF and intelligence agencies in Kashmir need to be placed under the command of the army for better command, control and coordination. Proposal to co-locate RR Directorate with HQ Northern Command would be a good move in this direction.  Inter-organisational egos need to be set aside for the time being. Until the situation on the ground improves, Amarnath Yatra should be curtailed to 15 days to reduce additional burden on the SF.

            It would be advisable for army commanders to focus more on the arduous job at hand in Kashmir and stay away from public pronouncements. Political posturing is best left to political leadership. Lastly, parties in power must refrain from seeking political mileage out of counter-insurgency operations, whatever those be.

            New Delhi needs to reassess its options and come up with fresh ideas to contain and then eliminate growing insurgency in Kashmir. Otherwise, India stands to lose. 

http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/kashmir-sustaining-insurgency/

References:

1.        Majid Jahangir, ‘For the first time in nearly a decade, the number of listed militants in Kashmir has crossed 300’, Tribune News Service, Sept 3, 2018, available at https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/jammu-kashmir/first-time-in-decade-militant-number -crosses-3oo-in-valley-646821.html

2.        Sunmantra Bose, ‘The Evolution of Kashmiri Resistance’, Al Jazeera, August 2, 2011, available at https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/kashmirtheforgottenconflict/2011/07/2011715143415277754.html

3.        Ibid.

4.        Wikipedia.

5.        Ikram Ullah, ‘India Losing Kashmir’, The South Asian Channel, May 5, 2016, available at https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/05/india-is-losing-kashmir/

6.        Mehmood Ur Rashid, ‘Why Kashmir’s Armed Insurgency Is Not a Variant of Terrorism’, Economic & Political Weekly,  May 12, 2018, available at https://www.epw.in/engage/article/why-kashmirs-armed-insurgency-not-variant-terrorism .

7.        Ibid.

8.        Harinder Baweja , ‘Kashmir’s Disturbing New Reality’, Hindustan Times, available at https;// www.hindustantimes.com/static/the-young-militants-of-kashmir/index.html .

9.        Ibid 1.

10.     Ibid 6.

11.     Prabha Rao, ‘Online Radicalisation: The Example of Burhan Wani’, Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, July 16, 2016, available at https://idsa.in/online-radiclisation-burhan-wani_prao_160716 .

12.     Tauseef Mustafa, ‘A Rift Opens in the Kashmir Valley’, Strat for Worldview, June 15, 2017, available at https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/rift-opens-kashmir-valley .

13.     Business Standard, available at https://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/isjk-chief-among-four-terrorists-killed-in-kashmir-cop-and-civilian-dead-118062200754_1.html .

14.     India Today news, available at https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/2-suspected-islamic-state-terrorists-arrested-in-delhi-1334609-2018-09-07 .

15.     Mir Ehsan, ‘After tit-for-tat abductions, all 11 relatives of J&K police released by militants’, Hindustan Times, August 31, 2018, available at https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/all-abducted-relatives-of-policemen-in-kashmir-released/story-KhqKcJcgTeQrlaqZ4BmZSJ.html .

16.     Major Maroof Raza, ‘Strategic Dimensions of the Kashmir Issue’, Indian Defence Review, July 26, 2017, available at http://www.indiandefencereview.com/the-strategic-dimensions-of-the-kashmir-issue .

17.     ‘Al Fatah is the biggest espionage groups unearthed in Jammu & Kashmir’, India Today Magazine, February 29, 1984,available at https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/cover-story/story/19840229-al-fatah-is-biggest-espionage-groups-unearthed-in-jammu-kashmir-802836-1984-02-29 .

18.     Information gathered during interaction with locals in the Valley.

19.     Harinder Baweja, ‘Mufti Sayeed’s dark hour: Militants released for abducted daughter’,Hindustan Times, July 15, 2019, available https://www.hindustantimes.com/india/mufti-saeed-s-dark-hour-militants-released-for-abducted-daughter/story-527VIWsrLi2F3kiQ1hTT4O.html .

20.     Prabhash. K. Dutta, ‘When Saifuddin Soz’s daughter Nahida was kidnapped by Kashmiri Terrorists’,  India Today, June 22, 2018, available at https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/when-saifuddin-soz-s-daughter-nahida-was-kidnapped-by-kashmiri-terrorists-1267020-2018-06-22 .

21.     Ibid

22.     Harinder Baweja, India Today Magazine, November 15, 1993,  available at https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/cover-story/story/19931115-hazratbal-siege-raises-anti-india-tempo-in-kashmir-valley-gives-militants-avoidable-boost-811811-1993-11-15 .

23.     Ramesh Vinayak, Kashmir: Despite killing of key militants at Charar shrine, India loses a battle, India Today Magazine, May 31, 1995, available at https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/cover-story/story/19950531-kashmir-despite-killing-of-key-militants-at-charar-shrine-india-loses-a-battle-807323-1995-05-31 .

24.     .Team PGuru, August 31, 2017, available at https://www.pgurus.com/bitta-karate-the-butcher-of-kashmiri-pandits-is-a-millionnaire-too/ . 

25.     India.com, July 24, 2017, available at  http://www.india.com/news/india/kashmiri-pandits-genocide-supreme-court-refuses-probe-into-215-cases-relief-for-yasin-malik-2345427/ .

26.     Early Times, Jammu, “PM Modi may trifurcate J&K in next one or two months?’ ,September 11, 2018, available at http://www.earlytimes.in/m/newsdet.aspx?q=242262 .